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Abstract The Alps are highly impacted by debris flows
that cause major problems for companies and transport
networks located in the valley bottoms. One such event
occurred in the Rif Blanc catchment and affected the road
network in the French Alps, as well as adjacent areas across
the Italian border, for several days in June 2012. This
article presents two independent approaches to vulnera-
bility assessment. Based on investigations conducted dur-
ing a survey of local authorities following the event, we
compared theoretical risk management and real crisis
management in terms of decision making and modes of
intervention. Functional vulnerability and territorial con-
sequences were analyzed using a best travel time model of
accessibility. We show that a bottom-up approach is
practiced in case of actual management planning with a
central coordination of general council. Conversely theo-
retical crisis management shows prefect as the key actor
supported by several other state institutions. Our analysis
also revealed that a debris flow event with a local impact
on the road network has territorial consequences at a
regional scale. This study contributes to the discussion
about how to minimize the vulnerability of alpine transport
networks prone to debris flows. Our results could serve as a
decision support tool for public authorities.
Keywords Crisis management  Debris flows  French
Alps  Road network vulnerability
1 Introduction
Debris flows are rapid flows of saturated nonplastic debris
within a steep channel (Hungr 2005) that owe their
destructive power to the interaction of solid and fluid forces
(Iverson 1997). In mountain areas like the Alps, debris flows
are a serious threat as they periodically damage critical
infrastructure and disrupt transport networks (Jomelli et al.
2011; Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al. 2011; Fuchs et al. 2013).
Becausemany valleys are landlocked, disruption of transport
networks not only affects the damaged area, but extends to all
areas and activities linked to it. Depending on the overall
dependency of the region on the disrupted network, such
situations can cause a considerable economic and social
impact (Masiero and Maggi 2012).
In recent decades, many studies on the Alps were focused
on understanding the dynamics of debris flows such as the
meteorological conditions that were responsible for trig-
gering slope failure (Caine 1980; Guzzetti et al. 2007) and
links with climate change (Jomelli et al. 2007; Pavlova et al.
2014). But the likelihood that an exposed component would
suffer damage as a result of a debris flow is a concept that has
not been adequately explored and whose evaluation is not
standardized (Gleyze 2007; Fuchs et al. 2007).
Originally, the concept of transport vulnerability was
introduced by transport specialists to assess the conse-
quences of a network disruption related to an accident,
whatever its origin (Jenelius et al. 2006; Jenelius 2010).
Road network vulnerability analysis can be defined as the
study of potential degradation of the road transport system
and its impact on society (Jenelius and Mattsson 2014), for
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example, economic impacts and delays. Most studies
considered transport networks from the point of view of
engineering: network connectivity/accessibility (Dalvi and
Martin 1978; Chapelon 1996; Bell 2000; Berdica 2002;
Sullivan et al. 2010), traffic flow, network reliability, and
degradation of the road service (Wakabayashi and Kameda
1992; Gleyze and Reghezza 2007; Lhomme 2012; Tacnet
et al. 2013).
Recent studies have focused on the direct impacts of
debris flows on the road network in order to estimate the
physical vulnerability of road infrastructure to gravity-
driven hazards such as debris flows (Winter et al. 2014).
Assessments of the structural and physical impacts of
landslides and debris flows were proposed (Quan Luna
et al. 2011; Papathoma-Kho¨le et al. 2012) that use fragility
curves related to various infrastructures (Pitilakis et al.
2006). Other approaches consisted in identifying the parts
of the roadway structure that are exposed to risk (Wiec-
zorek et al. 2004; Galli and Guzzetti 2007; Geertsema et al.
2009; Winter et al. 2009, 2010). In the French Alps, Le´one
et al. (2011) combined assessing the physical vulnerability
of the road network with modeling of both functional and
territorial vulnerability to debris flows in terms of loss of
accessibility in order to identify potentially vulnerable
sections of the road. Beyond the issue of impacts Pramudita
et al. (2014) raised the question of the quantity of debris
left on a road. Budetta (2002) suggested calculating the
‘‘average vehicle risk’’ to measure the spatial probability of
a vehicle being damaged in the debris flow hazard zone.
Despite these studies, two major issues are still poorly
explored. The first concerns the indirect consequences of
the disruption of a network for a territory due to a debris
flow (Demoraes and D’Ercole 2009). The second issue is
how decision-makers use the road network in the case of
failure, especially in mountainous areas. In landlocked
territories, the extent of damage to transportation and the
speed of repairs are thus critical determinants of how
quickly a disaster stricken area can recover (Chang 2003).
Petrova (2006) suggested that the intensity of damage and
its effects depend not only on the hazard itself, but also on
protection and prevention measures. Atzl and Keller (2013)
pointed out that critical network infrastructure is regulated
by institutions in the social environment. Identifying these
institutions and how they manage a crisis in the case of a
network disruption is thus a major concern.
The present study had two goals. First, we wanted to
evaluate the consequences of a debris flow event on the
territorial accessibility in the French Alps including the
Italian border. We wanted to estimate the real impact of the
disruption on the whole road network. Our second goal was
to analyze the decision-making process and emergency
planning concerning the transportation network in the case
of a debris flow whose intensity was moderate (with a
recurrence interval of a few years) without fatalities that
corresponds to the most debris flow cases in the French
Alps (Pavlova et al. 2014). As a case study, we used a
debris flow event that occurred on 4 June 2012, in the Rif
Blanc catchment (French Alps) that impacted a road and
disrupted the busiest link of the regional network for sev-
eral days.
The article is organized as follows: in Sect. 2, we
describe the study area and the damage to the road caused
by the 4 June 2012 debris flow event. In Sect. 3, we present
the two independent methods used to compare decision
making and theoretical interventions by government
authorities in the actual process that took place while the
transport network was disrupted. In Sects. 4 and 5 we detail
the differences between theoretical decision making con-
cerning crisis management and that reported by the emer-
gency services and actual loss of accessibility in the
territory. Finally, in Sect. 6, we discuss the limits of our
investigation.
2 Study Area
The field work was conducted in the French Alps. About
five debris flow events are triggered each year by rainy
events in this region and cause damage to the road network
(Pavlova et al. 2014; Jomelli et al. 2015). Here we focus on
a debris flow event that occurred on 4 June 2012 in the
Hautes-Alpes district that was viewed as a representative
case of debris flows in the French Alps that impact road
network (Pavlova et al. 2014). This choice was based on
several factors. The event was recent and post-event field
investigations just after the event were possible. It impac-
ted a strategic road that connects two departments and is
used by a lot of vehicles each day. This portion of road has
been already impacted by debris flows in the past decades.
The volume of the debris flow event that occurred on 4
June 2012 was similar to previous events and not particu-
larly important. The event did not cause injuries or fatali-
ties and thus the risk management planning can be
considered as representative of most debris flow cases in
the French Alps.
2.1 Debris Flow Event, 4 June 2012
In the morning of 4 June 2012, a debris flow occurred in
the Rif Blanc catchment following several rainy days in the
Guisane valley, which is located in the northern part of the
Hautes-Alpes region of the French Alps. The deposits
extended 94 linear meters along the D1091 road and
blocked it (Fig. 1). The physical damage was estimated by
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the decision-makers to be about USD 30,000. Direct
damage resulted in an 8 h blockage of road traffic despite
the small volume of debris on the road, which was esti-
mated between 10,000 and 15,000 m3 by the local
authorities. The recurrence interval of an event of this scale
is 1.8 per year.
Traffic was able to get through again in the late after-
noon, but only on one lane, which necessitated a system of
alternating traffic. The effects of the disturbance continued
for a week with consequences not only for road traffic but
also for the regional economy. During the disturbance, road
users followed a detour route via the city of Gap to reach
the Grenoble-Brianc¸on axis.
This catchment is known to be active geomorphically,
and at least five debris-flow events have been observed
over the last 30 years. The first event in 2008 was recorded
in the regional debris-flow survey, which has been con-
ducted by the local authorities under the Department for the
Restoration of Mountain Land (Service de Restauration des
Terrains de Montagne; RTM) and the General Council of
the Hautes-Alpes (Conseil Ge´ne´ral des Hautes-Alpes)
since the end of the nineteenth century. Most events
occurred between May and July. Each event had an impact
on a regional road that was then closed to road users with a
comparable duration with the last event.
2.2 Strategic Value of the D1091 Road
The D1091 road that links Grenoble and Brianc¸on is
117 km long, and is the only road that crosses the Guisane
valley and the Lautaret pass (Fig. 1). The Guisane valley is
close to Italy. The Lautaret pass is defined by the General
Council of the Hautes-Alpes region (Tacnet et al. 2013) as
the main economic link, and constant pressure is exerted by
local decision-makers and tourism professionals to limit its
closure. Indeed, the local population and professionals
need continuous access to the valley. The densest road
traffic is mainly in summer. In 2011, 2665 vehicles were
counted per day per year, compared with 2757 vehicles per
day in June, 4892 vehicles per day in July, and 4918
vehicles per day in August. Traffic in both directions passes
through the entire section subject to debris flow hazard, but
no protective measures have been taken so far. These facts
highlight the vulnerability of this portion of the road net-
work and its strategic value related to debris flow occur-
rence in the Rif Blanc catchment.
Fig. 1 Elevation representation of the Rif Blanc catchment with an aerial photograph of the D1091 road infrastructure in the catchment (a), and
a shaded relief map of the main road network between the cities of Grenoble and Brianc¸on (b)
188 Utasse et al. Territorial Accessibility and Decision-Making Structure Related to Debris Flow Impacts
123
3 Conceptual Approach
Initially we analyzed the decision-making processes before
and after the debris flow crisis. We compared the theoret-
ical diagnosis of crisis management provided by official
state sources with real field measurements collected from
interviews with decision-makers following the 4 June 2012
debris flow event that damaged the road network. Subse-
quently we focused on the loss of territorial accessibility
due to the impacts of the debris flow on the road network.
The accessibility of the road network was analyzed and
allowed us to evaluate territorial vulnerability.
4 Assessment of the Decision-Making Processes
Our analysis of the decision-making processes was based
on two separate steps. In the first step, we evaluated the
theoretical risk management described by the authorities.
In the second step, we conducted interviews with local
decision-makers to estimate how risk management really
proceeded during and after the debris flow event on 4 June.
4.1 Evaluation of Theoretical Risk Management
To better understand how the authorities reacted to events
that impacted the road network, we conducted a crisis
management analysis. We considered the intervention
methods of different operational and organizational actors
responsible for risk management with the aim to identify
the specific role of the different actors and the hierarchy
between actors. To this end we: (1) identified the most
appropriate French administrative level for this kind of
event; (2) determined the hierarchy between administrative
institutions, civil protection, and management of the road
networks; and (3) analyzed the actions and the decision-
making processes implemented by managers, such as
actions proposed by pre-crisis planning processes.
Our analysis focused on state decision-makers that are
involved in crisis management at a regional and local scale
related to the road network impacted by a natural hazard.
Our goal was to identify who is doing what and who
depends on whom. In order to construct an organization
chart we visited national, regional, and local official web-
sites of the different institutions involved in natural hazard
crisis management (Se´curite´ civile dans la gestion des
risques (defense and civil rescue service)1; Institut des
Risques Majeurs (major risk institute)2; Direction
Re´gionale de l’Environnement, de l’Ame´nagement et du
Logement (DREAL) de Provence Alpes Coˆte d’Azur
(PACA); Cartographie des Risques Majeurs dans les
Hautes- Alpes (regional department of natural hazard
mapping)3; Services de l’Etat Relatif aux Risques Naturels
dans les Hautes-Alpes (Hautes-Alpes natural hazards
department)4; Centre d’Information pour la Pre´vention des
Risques Majeurs en Re´gion PACA (Center of major risks
prevention)5; Direction De´partementale des Territoires
(DDT) des Hautes-Alpes (Direction of territories of the
Hautes-Alpes department); Direction Interde´partementale
des Routes (DIR) (interdepartmental direction of roads;
Direction Re´gionale de l’Environnement (DIREN) (re-
gional direction of environment), among others) because
state management aims to prevent risks to the public. We
also analyzed local services (for instance, the General
Council of the Hautes-Alpes region, Regional Fire and
Rescue Service, Police Center, Technical Regional Direc-
tion, National Forestry Authority) as we assumed that their
local administrative level would be directly involved in
crisis management.
We made several assumptions to adjust our diagnosis of
risk management to reflect local conditions. Our crisis
management hypothesis was based on:
(1) the vertical organization of the different authorities
according to French levels of administration;
(2) such operations are the responsibility of local and
regional services;
(3) mobilization of human and material resources is
specific to interventions following natural hazard
events, especially when debris flows affect the road
network;
(4) local stakeholders in this mountain area are particu-
larly dependent on the maintenance of the road
network; and territorial isolation is a serious concern
for local actors.
These assumptions helped us prepare interviews with
local actors. The interviews would confirm (or not) our
assumptions concerning crisis management.
4.2 Interviews with Decision-Makers
After the event, we analyzed the processes involved in the
post-disaster decision-making and organizational processes
by asking the authorities the questions listed in Table 1.
Legal regulations, political organization, and the rela-
tionships between the different stakeholders can have a
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decisive impact on transport vulnerability. We divided the
interviews into two parts: the first part concerned the local
authorities responsible for the transport network and the
second concerned independent actors who did not belong
to the mentioned state institutions (Table 2). An analysis of
local TV and press media gave us an idea of the response
actions realized to cope with the debris flow event. Forty-
two local people were interviewed.
4.3 Result of the Assessment of Decision-Making
Structure
Interviews with local decision-makers and other institution
members made it possible to assess the theoretical deci-
sion-making structure and compare that structure with
actual post crisis management.
4.3.1 The Theoretical Decision-Making Process
Despite the complexity of risk management procedures
(and the lack of transparency in the decision-making
process), we were able to define a theoretical decision-
making process validated by the authorities. Figure 2 is an
organizational chart of crisis management adjusted to a
natural event of moderate intensity affecting the road net-
work at a regional scale only, without fatalities.
The crisis management chart in Fig. 2 reflects the
complexity of the procedures and the number of state
institutions involved in the crisis management that follows
a top-down management planning. The prefect is in charge
of the management as soon as the impacts (direct or indi-
rect as for the road network) of the natural hazard are larger
than the territory of the village. Two levels of responsi-
bility can be distinguished: at the higher level the prefect
and the municipal administration make the decisions and
plan the necessary actions, and at the lower level network
managers, including the general council, are responsible
for ensuring the maintenance of the road network.
This kind of crisis management is characteristically
based on setting up temporary organizations devoted to
help better communication between the different adminis-
trative institutions. These task forces temporarily bring
Table 1 Questions asked during interviews
Topic Questions
Alert How were stakeholders informed of the event?
What warning systems were used?
Decision process What is your specific role in decision making / planning interventions during the crisis?
Intervention How long after the event did the intervention take place?
What resources were mobilized for traffic management and the removal of debris from the road?
Communication What information channels were available to the public and professionals about road conditions?




What detour route is recommended when traffic between Grenoble and Brianc¸on via the regional road D1091 is interrupted?






Prefect Regional One person from the administration staff
General Council of Hautes-
Alpes
Four people from road and risk services
Technical Regional Direction One person (the project manager of Natural Hazards)
National Forestry Authority Seven people from RTM (service managers, engineers, technicians)
Regional Fire and Rescue
Service
Six people (service managers and fire brigades from different towns)
Police Center Local Six people (service managers and local stations)




Staff of archives Regional Two people
Members of associations Four people (video associations, local geological association)
Staff of media Three people from Dauphine´ Libe´re´ journal
190 Utasse et al. Territorial Accessibility and Decision-Making Structure Related to Debris Flow Impacts
123
together the representative decision-makers of each ser-
vice. They are supervised by the prefect and the mayor.
The chart provides information on the hierarchy of
authorities, but no details are given on the time required to
plan actions or organize executive missions.
4.3.2 Actual Management of the Crisis Following
the Event Based on Information Collected
in Interviews with Decision-Makers
Interviews with decision-makers immediately after the
event allowed us to compare what actually happened with
the information provided by government sources. This
approach addresses the issue of responsibility of decision-
makers, their modes of intervention, their reactivity in the
face of a damaging event, and their modes of communi-
cation (Fig. 3).
The first warning usually comes from an eye witness (a
road user, for example) calling from a cell phone or from
an emergency call box (Step 1, Fig. 3). Road patrols may
also raise the alarm. In both cases, the call is relayed to the
public emergency services (Step 2, Fig. 3). These services
relay the information directly to the network managers
involved. In parallel, the military police are in charge of
regulating traffic and ensuring road safety. The time lag
between the alert and the intervention should be less than
1 h.
Figure 3 reveals the differences between the theoretical
organization summarized in Fig. 2 and what really hap-
pened. The actual organization is based on a bottom-up
process that does not strictly follow the same links and
hierarchies between state institutions as those reported in
Fig. 2. Here we noticed that the decision-makers differ
from those involved in the theoretical crisis management.
The General Council of the Hautes-Alpes department is the
chief network manager in the operational chain (Step 3,
Fig. 3) together with its territorial agencies. No govern-
ment services at all are listed as leader in Fig. 3 and the
role of the municipality is smaller than indicated in the
theoretical organization chart (Fig. 2). The Prefect’s staff is
informed by Gendarmerie. The General Council is
involved in each step of crisis management, maintenance
Fig. 2 Theoretical decision-making organizational chart that would apply to territorial authorities in the case of a natural hazard affecting the
regional road network
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of the road network, any necessary interventions, and the
governance of the territory. It is in charge to inform people
of bypass solutions. This differs from the theoretical
administrative hierarchy of state services depicted in
Fig. 2.
The human and material resources deployed on site
(Step 4, Fig. 3), as well as the information for road users,
are not specific to a debris flow event. The procedure is the
same for any kind of damage to the road network.
According to the network managers, a landlocked territory
caused by a blocked road network does not appear to be a
cause of real fear. In the case of an occasional event, the
crisis could be resolved in a relatively short time (Step 5,
Fig. 3) and a detour route set up until the situation returns
to normal. Contrary to the information provided by official
government websites, there is no particular action plan for
a natural hazard that affects the transport network.
The General Councils provide a live broadcast of traffic
conditions via a specific internet platform, along with
information for road users, on electronic road signs. This
information is intended to warn road users. In the case of the
Rif Blanc debris flow event, the information was displayed
on signs between the cities of Grenoble and Brianc¸on.
Network managers told us in their interviews that they
consider operational coordination and communication to be
indispensable (Step 3, Fig. 3). For that reason, possible
cooperation is currently under discussion between France
and Italy for the management of the network at
international scale. Existing communication channels
between General Council and its counterparts in neigh-
boring regions allow traffic detours to be set up and the
public to be informed (Step 4, Fig. 3). Yet no official
procedure exists for cooperation with other state authorities
responsible for the management of the French transport
network. Despite efforts to increase trade and to develop
partnerships, joint management of the transport network at
the scale of the French Alps is still difficult, especially
organization, communication, and action planning. This
type of communication currently depends on sporadic
informal exchanges between (governmental) agents. Con-
flicts of interest at the level of managers may prevent the
establishment of real collaborative projects.
Decision-makers only focused on the direct impacts of
debris flow and on the regional organization of road traffic
on the day the event took place. But Steps 5 and 6 in Fig. 3
show that debris were removed from the road about 12 h
after the event and it was seven days before the road traffic
returned to normal. The interviews suggest that all deci-
sion-makers underestimated the functional consequences of
the event, such as how long the disturbance would last, the
extent of the network affected, and the difficulties
encountered in ensuring the best possible continuity of
transport despite the disruption of the network. The main
concern of official decision-makers was restoration of a
section of road traffic as quickly as possible to avoid
anyone being isolated.
Fig. 3 The actual decision-making process and management of the crisis after a debris flow event affected the regional road network
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5 Loss of Territorial Accessibility Assessment
Our analysis was conducted in two steps. In the first step,
we evaluated network disruption, and in the second step,
we used a model to quantify territorial vulnerability.
5.1 Evaluation of Network Disruption: Territorial
Accessibility Indicators
We used simple accessibility indicators as input variables
to assess travel possibilities. This is standard procedure
before more complex accessibility models are used (Morris
et al. 1979). In the present case, the indicators were travel
time, distance, and cost including fuel and road tolls of the
different alternative routes. Accessibility indicators were
used to evaluate the ease of connecting to the transport
system in the case of a change in the spatial organization of
the network. This approach involves defining the exact start
location and the exact destination of the journey.
5.2 Network Modeling
We used an accessibility model to quantify the loss of
territorial accessibility in terms of difference in travel time
using the damaged network. For the present study, we used
the RouteFinder model based on Dijkstra’s algorithm
(1959) to estimate accessibility from a starting point in a
network to an endpoint. The network is represented by a
graph, symbolized by arcs for road segments and nodes
denoting intersections. RouteFinder operates directly in a
GIS environment with attribute data and was configured
only for light vehicles. A calculation of difference in travel
time between normal and road damage situations (due to
longer travel distance only) is made automatically with
RouteFinder.
The road database used in this study was the BD TOPO
provided by the IGN (Institut ge´ographique national /
National Geographic Institute). RouteFinder requires a
table of network features (Table 3). This table has to
consider both the relative hierarchy of each axis and a
user’s travel direction (Appert and Chapelon 2006). These
two parameters are important because they affect the level
of accessibility. Since the model is based on the travel time
concept, the main factor to be considered is the speed limit
on each type of axis. This parameter was averaged using
web-based route planning calculators. This avoids overes-
timating the results by using the maximum speed limit,
which does not necessarily reflect real travel time.
5.3 Definition of the Scenarios
The Grenoble-Brianc¸on itinerary was chosen as the refer-
ence road axis (Fig. 1). This itinerary corresponds to a
regional road connecting two strategic urban nodes in the
alpine region. Next, we identified all possible detour routes
that could be used in the case of traffic disruption in the
Guisane valley. All these routes were taken into account in
the model, including the borderland area with Italy.
Two types of scenarios were compared to assess terri-
torial accessibility: (1) a normal situation with no disrup-
tion of the road network; and (2) the situation in the
aftermath of the Rif Blanc debris flow event. The route
from Grenoble to Brianc¸on was chosen for both scenarios.
Given the scale of the network in the study area, terri-
torial accessibility in terms of travel time was broken down
into discrete classes of 30 min as a compromise between
Table 3 Travel speed classes as a function of the degree of importance of the road
Administrative classes of roads
(BDTOPO)
Attribute value (BDTOPO) Averaged speed
(km h-1)
Travel speed class
Main road Links major cities
Links countries
Highways, express national roads
110 1
Main road Links regions
Links high-priority traffic between major cities
Provides an alternative to highways with tolls
Allows traffic to bypass cities
70 2
Secondary road Connects cities
Connects regions
Serves localities and major tourist areas
Crosses obstacles (bridges, mountain passes, etc.).
60 3
Secondary road Provides local links in rural areas
Structures traffic in urban areas
50 4
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the accuracy of the results and the computation time
required. The best travel time is the minimum accessibility
value between the two places and reflects the optimal
functioning of the transport network in a given time
interval (Chapelon 2003).
5.4 Results of the Loss of Territorial Accessibility
The loss of territorial accessibility was analyzed consid-
ering distance, time, and cost, which are detailed below.
5.4.1 Detour Routes, Distance, Time, and Cost
In the case of traffic disruption on the D1091 road linking
Grenoble and Brianc¸on, the General Council of the Hautes-
Alpes suggests one main detour to road users. To get a
better view of territorial accessibility, we compared all
alternative roads in the Alpine transport network (Fig. 4):
• Itinerary 1 (IT1) (Reference route). Main itinerary:
Grenoble—Brianc¸on using the RD1091 road in the
normal situation, via the Guisane valley.
• Itinerary 2 (IT2). Grenoble—Brianc¸on by way of Gap
and Argentie`re-la-Besse´e on roads RN85, RN94, as
suggested by the General Council of Hautes-Alpes
Department to road users.
• Itinerary 3 (IT3). Grenoble—Brianc¸on by way of Ise`re
Department, Gap, and Argentie`re-la-Besse´e, highway
A51, departmental roads D1075 and D994, national
road RN94.
• Itinerary 4 (IT4). Grenoble—Brianc¸on by way of
Modane in Savoie Department and Italy: highway
A41, highway A43, national road RN94.
The shortest detour was itinerary 2, but the fastest travel
time was on itinerary 4 using limited access (autoroute)
highways. The disruption of the network added one hour or
more travel time to all itineraries. Road users had to drive
at least 72 additional kilometers to reach the same desti-
nation. The cost reached as much as three times the original
cost.
5.4.2 Mapping Territorial Loss of Accessibility
Modeling road accessibility based on GIS enabled us to
compute a map of accessibility. This map shows the extra
time needed for access at the regional scale in a disturbed
situation due to a network disruption in the Rif Blanc
catchment. The map was based on the previously estab-
lished detour routes between the cities of Grenoble and
Brianc¸on, including Italy. The entire road network was
included to better represent the consequences of the dis-
turbances at the regional scale.
The map of additional access time shows a gradual
deterioration of accessibility in the disturbed situation along
with the scenario showing the normal situation from the city
of Grenoble to Brianc¸on (Fig. 5). The whole of the northern
part of the Hautes-Alpes Department is affected by a delay
time longer than one hour in accordance with Figs. 4 and 5
(portion of road in red on Fig. 5). Road disturbances affect
both main and secondary roads. However, the disruption did
not create a situation of isolation even if access to the valley
corridors was very disturbed, especially in the tourist valleys
to the north of the towns of Brianc¸on and Gap. The linear
representation of the degradation of territorial accessibility
shows the impact on the two main detour roads via the towns
of Gap and Argentie`re-la-Besse´e.
Figure 5 shows the access time from Grenoble city to
the whole territory. Normally, the road section in orange in
Fig. 5 should be reached by using the Rif Blanc road. The
normal duration of the travel is 125 min (Fig. 4, IT1). Due
to the failure at Rif Blanc, however, an extra travel time is
needed from Grenoble because drivers have to use a longer,
more southerly route via Gap that passes through Argen-
tie`re-la-Besse´e (IT2 in Fig. 4).
6 Discussion and Conclusion
Most studies of vulnerability on road networks prone to
natural hazards focus on structural impacts (Jomelli 2011).
In this article, we attempted to document the structure of
crisis management made for this kind of event that affects a
road network in mountain areas of France. This study
tackles the concept of indirect risk by assessing the terri-
torial consequences of the disruption of a road network
caused by a debris flow. Here we focused on a crisis
management devoted to a natural hazard with moderate
intensity. However, new investigations are needed to
explore the possible differences in actual crisis manage-
ment applied in case of an intense (low return period)
debris flow event with fatalities or a debris flow event that
impacts a road that connects France to Italy.
Comparison of the theoretical risk management model
(based on information provided by government sources)
with the actual situation after the debris flow event (as
reported by local decision-makers in interviews) allowed
us to identify the actors involved in crisis management in
terms of decision making, liability, and interventions. The
comparison revealed that, in practice, crisis management is
the responsibility of regional network managers rather than
of the government authorities usually featured in organi-
zational charts depicting French risk management. Overall,
the physical impacts on the road and the functional dis-
turbances were satisfactorily managed by the government
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officials. Our analysis shows that a debris flow event with a
local impact on the road network has territorial conse-
quences at the regional scale. Efforts were made to propose
rapidly a bypass to the impacted road section at Rif Blanc
catchment area. But several days were needed to return to
the initial situation, involving extra travel time and cost for
several hundred of people. It is however interesting to
recall that several debris flows occurred in the past in the
same catchment with about the same impacts on road.
Despite these frequent events the adaptation and resilience
strategies in the management planning are still limited as
we could expect a shorter time to recover the initial
situation.
Theoretical management planning envisages temporary
organizations devoted to help better communication
between the different administrative institutions. The
actual crisis management did not use such temporary
organization that is probably difficult to set up rapidly.
Despite the fact that this portion of road is close to the
Italian border, the communication with Italy was limited to
electronic road signs in France only.
Our field surveys were only conducted with institutional
network managers. To complete our analysis, it would be
useful to compare these results with surveys of network
users including transport companies or local inhabitants
who regularly use these roads. A quantification of the real
socioeconomic impacts of such consequences based on an
accurate description of people (number, profession,
Fig. 4 Possible routes from Grenoble to Brianc¸on in kilometers (km),
access time in minutes (min), and cost in USD (fuel, road tolls). In the
bar chart, the reference itinerary 1 is in black; green shows the extra
cost; blue shows the extra time, and red the extra kilometers
compared with itinerary 1
Fig. 5 Difference in access time (in minutes) from Grenoble between
normal and disturbed situations caused by a debris flow event in the
Rif Blanc catchment (total road cut). This additional access time is
calculated using the fastest road to each section of the territory. The
major impact is obtained for the Brianc¸on area
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destination, and so on) would help to determine the global
cost of such seven-day delay.
Our model of road accessibility did not include the flow
of traffic or the ability of detour roads to cope with the
volume of road flow (Jenelius et al. 2006). The use of
accessibility graphs could be combined with multi-agent
models to assess the impact of road disturbances by sim-
ulating the shift in the flow of road traffic (Sahal and Morin
2012).
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